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were flying *ritu grandinis*, and of the great assault when *inaestimabiles copiae in modum alitum ferebantur*. The defenders were so packed that no weapon fell in vain (19.7.4). Once (19.6.1) *adspiravit <eis> auram* quendam salutis fortuna, but their usual feeling was that of despair, for Sabinianus brought no help (19.3.3): . . . *nil proficiens visebatur ut leo, magnitudine corporis et torvitate terribilis, inclusos intra retia catulos periculo ereptum ire non audens, unguibus ademptis et dentibus*.

With these verbal illuminations go touches of coloring in the description of the Persians, and mention of varying shades of light: *Cum primum aurora fulgeret* (19.1.2); *caligine tenebrarum* (19.1.9); *ne vespertinae quidem hebetaverunt tenebrae* (19.2.10); *albescente iam die* (19.7.3); *ingruente iam vespera* (19.7.5); *nitescente iam luce* (19.8.1); *vespera tenebrante* (19.8.5).

All these passages differ from their models in rhetorical coloring, an element which Ammianus recognized in his portrayal of Julian (16.1.2-3):

. . . *singula, serie progrediente, monstrabo, instrumenta omnia mediocris ingenii, si suffecerint, commoturus. Quicquid autem narrabitur, quod non falsitas arguta concinnat, sed fides integra rerum absolvit documentis eviditibus fulta, ad laudativam paene materiam pertinebit*.

The essence of this might be extended to a characterization of his own work, for, as a whole, it is, *ut ita dixerim*, an advocative history.

12. Conclusion

The convolutions in the style of Ammianus make his work practically a sealed book for Schools. One constantly recurring feature is plain, the separation of two terms joined by *et* by another part of speech. This can be expressed by the formula, *a b et a*, e. g. *per plana camporum et mollia* (14.2.5). Form, not uninteresting substance, is the barrier. This is true, though a passage may have a modern flavor, e. g. (19.2.11):

Agitatis itaque sub onere armorum vigiliis, resultabant altrinsecus exortis clamoribus colles, nostris virtutes Constanti Caesaris extollentibus ut domini rerum et mundi, Persis Saporem saansaan appellantis et pirosen, quod rex regibus imperans et bellorum victor interpretatur.

It is a shorter cut to read in the dictionary about the *barritum*, and the *buccelatum*, though Ammianus's explanation of *marha marha* (19.11.10), and of *σιωίπα*, quam vulgaris simplicitas susurnam appellat (16.5.5), may invite a reading. The statement of a manual may suffice, without an actual test, to show his use of a *quod*-clause instead of subject-accusative with infinitive, of the future participle expressing purpose, of *quasi*, *tamquam*, and *velut*, and of the pluperfect indicative in the apodosis of an unreal condition, e. g. in 23.3.3. . . *ni multiplex iuvisset auxilium, etiam Cumana carmina consumperat magnitudo flammaram*.

Ammianus's history, as a portrayal of the practical consummation of all things Roman, is valuable for comparative purposes in showing the changes since early days. Whoever is interested in early Roman

discipline will also have an interest in the manifestations of the belief in *medio est imperium positum occupanti*; whoever admires the unnamed eagle-bearer who declared in Caesar, B.G. 4.25.3, *Ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero*, will have an equal and opposite admiration for the unnamed standard-bearer, who, on the death of Julian, deserted to the Persians and revealed conditions in the Roman army; whoever traces the rise of Roman oratory in Cicero's *Brutus* and *De Oratore*, and its decline in the *Dialogus De Oratoribus* can read of its extinction at Antioch (30.4); whoever reads the prophecy of Horace, *Carm.* 3.6.46 ff.,

aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit
nos nequiores, mox daturos
progeniem vitiosiore,

or the biting gibe of Juvenal (1.147 ff.),

nil erit ulterius, quod nostris moribus addat
posteritas; eadem facient cupientque minores;
omne in praecipiti vitium stetit,

will find a similar feeling expressed in 28.4.5:

Quae probra aliaque. . . ita effrenatus exarserunt, ut nec Epimenides ille Cretensis, si fabularum ritu ab inferis excitatus redisset ad nostra, solus purgare sufficeret Romam; tanta plerosque labes insanabilium flagitiorum oppressit;

whoever has traced with Tacitus the differentiation of German institutions will welcome the contrast in the primeval unity of the Huns (31.2.11):

. . . *inconsultorum animalium ritu, quid honestum inhonestumve sit penitus ignorantes, flexiloqui et obscuri, nullius religionis vel superstitionis reverentia aliquando districti, auri cupidine immensa flagrantes*.

And, so far as Ammianus himself is concerned, whoever, after considering the evidences of his thoroughgoing paganism in connection with Julian, will weigh with care all his expressions concerning Christianity may ask whether a change had not taken place in his religious views between the years 364 and 390 A.D.

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THE IDEAL ELEMENT IN THE POLITICS OF CICERO

In a brilliant lecture on Greek Politics, given, in November, 1921, at Columbia University, Dr. Alfred Zimmern, of Oxford, dwelt on the Greek conception of politics as a branch of morals. The Greeks were the first to hold that, as government exists not for the benefit of the ruler, but for the good of the whole people, it is the business, the pressing, unescapable moral obligation of every citizen to interest himself in politics and, according to his ability, to serve the State.

If the Greeks made political activity a duty, Cicero made it the supreme duty. He linked politics to religion and based his theory of the State on a spiritual view of the universe—that is, a belief in God, the Creator and Ruler, in men as the sons of God, and in justice as the common law of God and man. To this theory of the State Cicero was, I believe, never unfaithful.

My study of this topic is not complete. I have noted what seem to me the important points of Cicero's theoretical politics, and I have tried to show by a few references to his Letters that in the main he was true to his ideals and consistent in his practical politics. The whole subject is worthy of longer study.

I am glad that Cicero's political treatises, *De Republica* and *De Legibus*, tuned as they are to a lofty pitch of religious patriotism, are the product of his sober middle age. He had known the glories of the consulship and the bitterness of exile; he had learned all the difficulties of steering through the treacherous waters of politics. Therefore the optimism, the faith, and the ardor of these books have the greater weight with us. They do not express the enthusiasm of a warrior who has not yet girt his armor on, or of one whose battle is done, but, rather, of one who speaks from the battle-line, in a lull of the fighting, whose last and noblest struggle is still to come.

Cicero believed that justice is the foundation of the State. 'All that we have said about the State', he says, 'counts for nothing, unless this is established, that a State can in no way exist without the highest justice' (*De Republica* 2.70). But justice, to Cicero, is no commonplace term. It is the law of God, existing from all eternity and implanted in the minds of men. Human laws must be patterned after the divine law. A treatise on law must not commence with minor details, such as the regulations governing sewers and partition-walls, but with the source of all law, that is, with God.

Lactantius, the Christian Father, of the third century, says that Cicero praised divine law 'in a voice almost divine'. He goes on to quote, apparently, Cicero's own words (*Institutiones Divinae* 6.8.) I take time to cite the last few words, because even in translation the solemn beauty and dignity of the phrases are not lost:

'Every nation, at every time, shall be subject to one law eternal and unchangeable; there shall be one God, the common Master and Commander of all—the Author, Judge, and Sponsor of this law. Who-so shall not obey Him shall flee from himself and, denying his own nature, shall by this very act pay the uttermost penalty'.

Justice, then, implies a divine power behind and over the world. Sometimes Cicero calls it God, sometimes 'the gods', but the fundamental principle never varies—that mind, not matter, is in control. Whatever one may think about the fables of the gods, he says (*De Republica* 1.56), all who have thought nature worthy of investigation agree that the universe is ruled by mind.

Men, too, possess an element of the divine; in their perishing bodies the undying soul has been generated by Deity; thus they are akin to God and to one another. The world is the common home of gods and men. Every man who understands this should look upon all other men as his brothers and upon the universe as his home (*De Legibus* 1.23). Cicero calls the world a vast house, which is not enclosed in walls of human habitation, but embraces the entire

universe, a home which the gods share with us as the common dwelling of all intelligent beings (*De Republica* 1.19; *De Legibus* 1.23).

But this glorious ideal of the brotherhood of man was not a practical, working plan. Even now, two thousand years later, our international relations can scarcely be called brotherly. The League of Nations was lately opposed by many intelligent persons as either chimerical or dangerous. Nationalism still seems, as it did to Cicero, the most practicable form of social organization. Now, Cicero was a true Roman in his devotion to the practical. Ideals that could not be applied meant little to him. In certain definite ways, he applied the doctrine of universal brotherhood. He condemned all wars other than those for the defence of the State and her allies; he held that aliens in a State should have the same private rights as citizens, and that subjects, that is, provincials, should be governed for their own good only. But he was interested in the nation as the most manageable unit of society. His whole exposition of the divine in the universe and in man, and of the world-commonwealth, leads up to the study and praise of the Roman Republic.

As the State is based upon our common humanity, it follows that it must provide for the good of all, both rich and poor (*De Officiis* 2.85), citizen, and alien, and subject. A magistrate who favors one part of the people at the expense of another introduces a dangerous element of discord (*De Officiis* 1.85). He who gives justice to the citizen and not to the foreigner breaks up human society and so offends the gods who established society (*De Officiis* 3.28).

As the State is the medium through which justice works and a good life is made possible for men, it follows that the service of the State is the highest form of usefulness. 'There is nothing', Cicero maintains (*De Republica* 1.12), 'in which human virtue approaches nearer the gods than in founding new States or in strengthening those already founded'.

Cicero never ceased to reiterate that practical service to men was the end of all theoretical learning. Abstract philosophy might have the power to sharpen the wits of youth for more useful occupations (*De Republica* 1.30), but 'to act with consideration is worth more than to think wisely' (*De Officiis* 1.160), and 'serving one's country is better than counting the stars or measuring the earth' (*De Officiis* 1.154). Those who have qualifications for administering affairs must throw aside their reluctance and assume office, for in this way only can the State be carried on (*De Officiis* 1.72).

I note here that the notion of charity as public service did not occur to Cicero. Nor would it have occurred to anyone of his time. To him Mr. Herbert Hoover would seem much more important as Secretary of Commerce than as head of the American Relief Commission¹.

¹Reference may be made here, however, to an article entitled *Charities and Philanthropies in the Roman Empire*, by Professor Adeline Belle Hawes, *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 6. 178-181. C. K.

Since the service of the State is paramount in value, it reaps the greatest reward. The last book of the *De Republica*, known as the Dream of Scipio, promises glorious immortality to those who serve the nation. Here the spirit of the Elder Scipio, addressing his grandson, says (6.13):

'Be assured that for all those who have conduced to the preservation of their native country there is a certain place in heaven where they shall enjoy an eternity of happiness. For nothing on earth is more agreeable to God, the supreme Governor of the universe, than those assemblies of men which are called States. From heaven their rulers and preservers come, and thither they shall return'.

This is the strongest assertion regarding immortality that Cicero anywhere makes. In the Oration for Archias, the only sort of immortality to which he points is that of a great name that will live in the memory of posterity. In the *Tusculan Disputations*, Book I, he tells us that death is not to be dreaded, since it brings either rest from labors or a glorious after-life. But here, in a treatise on politics, when he is inspired by his great conception of human society as a very City of God, his faith grows stronger, and he speaks with assurance of immortality as a certain reward for serving humanity through the State.

It has been remarked, too, that Cicero puts this promise of immortality in the mouth of Scipio Africanus Maior, the ideal Roman of the older Republic. As Plato loved to make Socrates the spokesman of his ideas, so Cicero seeks force and prestige for his belief by claiming the sanction of Scipio's great name.

Cicero, then, bases his ideal State on unseen spiritual realities. The State is a community of men drawn together by their common divine inheritance of spirit and reason and held together by law. This human law is founded on divine law, which speaks in men's conscience and yet has existed from eternity as the thought of God. The State exists to promote the good life of all the people. Service to the State is the supreme opportunity for virtue. Through this service men may achieve immortality.

How was the good of the whole people to be attained? It was not to be attained, according to Cicero, by pure democracy or by a majority vote. He has a horror of the unrestrained rule of the populace. He calls equality, which disregards the distinction of best and worst in a nation, the supreme injustice (*De Republica* 1.53). 'The true statesman must guide the people as a Hindu does some huge beast' (*De Republica* 2.67). In this unflattering reference to the *plebs*, Cicero had in his mind's eye the elephants of some Oriental army.

But, if the rule of the untrained majority is bad, that of one man is equally dangerous. Under ideal conditions, the rule of a king might be best, if modelled after the government of the world by God; but, since men are imperfect, kings degenerate into tyrants and monarchies into despotisms. The only safe government is the mixed form, where a system of checks and balances prevents excess—where ruler and nobles and people, in exquisite counterpoise of power, maintain a constitution both free and stable.

This well-balanced government Cicero found in the older Roman State. Listen to the words of his creed (*De Republica* 1.70):

'And in these matters I feel, I believe, and I affirm that of all governments there is none which, either in its entire constitution or in the distribution of its parts or in its discipline, is comparable to that which our fathers received from our earliest ancestors and which they have handed down to us'.

In spite of his enthusiasm, though, Cicero was not blind to the failures of the Roman government of his own time. Sadly he admits that the Constitution has come down 'like a masterpiece beginning to fade, the colors of which no one has taken the trouble to renew' (*De Republica* 5.2).

The question now remains to be considered, whether Cicero was loyal to the lofty ideal of patriotism that he preached. William James tells us that the test of our beliefs is our willingness to act on them. Cicero's conduct has always been the target of bitter criticism. His harshest modern critics are the German historians, Drumann and Mommsen. The latter calls him 'a notorious political trimmer', and consistently leaves him no character at all.

But the French scholar, Gaston Boissier, comes to the defence and makes the telling rejoinder that Cicero is better understood in France and England than in Germany, because in the former countries men take part in political life and understand the compromises that are forced from a statesman by the needs of the time and the safety of his cause. On the other hand, the nonparticipation in politics of most citizens of Germany makes them unable to sympathize with such problems of Republican statecraft as Cicero had to meet (Boissier, *Cicéron et ses Amis*, 26).

It would be a subject for a book, not for a short paper like this, to follow the course of Cicero through the last years of the Republic. All we can do is to point to some general characteristics of his actions and to try to show by a few illustrations that his conduct was not inconsistent with his doctrines.

In the lecture to which we referred in our opening paragraph, Professor Zimmern said that the Greeks gave us two conceptions of a statesman—the artist and the physician. Plato was the artist, satisfied with nothing short of perfection; hence he described a State such as never was on land or sea. Aristotle was the physician, and believed that one must take poor human nature as one finds it and with it build the best State possible. If this is true of Aristotle in his theory, it is more strikingly true of Cicero in his practice. He took the poor broken fragments of the Republican body, torn by war, enfeebled by slavery, maimed by the loss of a substantial agricultural class, and tried through many years, with patience and a touching optimism, to restore it to health.

Death is not the greatest disaster for a man, he wrote, but it is the greatest disaster for a State (*De Republica* 3.34). By crushing the conspiracy of Catiline he did stave off the death of the Republic for

at least fifteen years, if one thinks of the monarchy as beginning with the victory of Caesar at Pharsalus.

There are three qualities of Cicero's character that have laid him open to hostile criticism and misunderstanding. But these very qualities are of immense value in all public life and in happier times would have brought success to Cicero's cause. The qualities I mean are these: ability to effect compromises, a gift for conciliation, and a buoyant spirit of hopefulness.

Cicero was willing to make many compromises to save the State. 'One need not always use the same words', he wrote to Lentulus, 'but one must look to the same end'. A striking sentence in the same letter gives his defence of compromises. 'In navigation', he says, 'it is an element of the art to yield to the weather, even if you cannot make the harbor. But if, by changing your course, you can reach the harbor, it is stupid to hold to the dangerous course that you had mapped out' (Ad Fam.1.9.21).

I must be content to give just one illustration of his many compromises for the good of the Republic. Early in his career, when a union between the Senate and the *equites* was the object nearest his heart, some Knights who had contracted for the collection of revenues in Asia made a bold demand on the Senate that their contract be cancelled, as they had bid too high and were going to lose money. They had no case; their demand was illegal and ridiculous, as Cicero said privately. But in the Senate he advocated their cause. Why? Because, he wrote to Atticus, there was the greatest danger that, if they did not get their way, they would be alienated from the Senate, and the union which he had cemented would be broken (Ad Att.1.17.9). Of course, the inflexible Cato, standing on the platform of strict legality, opposed Cicero and the *equites*. Fortunately, though, evening came on, and the Senate adjourned before Cato could speak. This is typical of the contrast between the two men. Cato also was devoted to the Republican Constitution; and, when he saw it was lost, he committed suicide. Cicero, on the other hand, made the best of circumstances and lived to lead the last great struggle—that against Antony. He failed in the end, because he fought irresistible forces; but he was more useful to his cause after the year 48 than was the dead Cato. I recall that St. Paul, early in his career, was ignominiously saved from assassination by being lowered from a city wall in a basket. All his work for the organizing of the Christian Church was done after that—no small service to the cause he loved.

Cicero was most skillful, too, in effecting conciliation between discordant elements. The most striking illustration occurs in the Letters of the last year of his life. He was alone in Rome, gathering together the motley forces of the Republic to fight Antony. He wrote indefatigably and sent cheering, encouraging, reproachful, warning letters to all sorts of men. He strove to keep loyal to the failing cause old generals of Caesar, provincial governors, men of the Pompeian party. He took pains never to mention the name of Brutus or Cassius to the Caesarian Plancus. He

kept his friendships quite distinct, for the cause of democracy needed the support of all elements. He paid compliments and voted honors to the young Octavian; and, when Brutus reproached him with this, he replied that 'the Senate was justified in using all honorable means to attach a man to the service of the State' (Ad Brutum 1.15.9). He seems to have been the only man of the time who had no private end to gain. Antony recognized his predominant influence in organizing the forces of the Republic and said in a rage that the Romans were fighting like two bands of gladiators and Cicero was their trainer (Phil.13.40).

No one can read the Letters without wondering at Cicero's invincible hopefulness. He never saw that the Republic was destined to fall. Four months before the end, he wrote to Decimus Brutus: 'The Senate is not without wisdom, nor the Roman people without valor, nor the Republic, so long as you live, without a general' (Ad Fam.11.18). It is not strange that a man living in the midst of that age of confusion did not see the trend of events. Aeneas did not understand that Troy was doomed until his goddess-mother opened his eyes to see the *numina magna deum* that were shaking its very foundations. The situation that seems so clear to us in the perspective of twenty centuries was confusion and darkness to those who struggled through it, one step at a time.

I suppose we have all been irritated by the effusive enthusiasm for Caesar expressed in the Oratio Pro Marcello, knowing as we do how Cicero rejoiced at Caesar's death a little later. The explanation is that Cicero really believed that Caesar's pardon of Marcellus at the request of the Senate showed his intention of restoring Republican rule. He wrote at that time in a private letter (Ad Fam.4.4), 'I thought I saw the Republic reborn that day!'

The oration, you remember, is not all fulsome praise; it contains this plea and admonition (27): 'You are so far from the completion of your greatest achievements that you have not yet laid the foundations. . . This part is still left for you, then, this act is still to be played, this work is still to be completed, namely, that you establish the Republic'.

Till the very end, Cicero seems to have hoped. If he is depressed by news that Antony is bringing legions from Macedonia, 'like chains for our necks', he soon takes hope again and writes to Atticus, 'It seems to me that the Republic is about to come into its own' (Ad Att.15.13).

When the young Octavian came, offering his services to the Senate, Cicero was naturally doubtful; but his doubts were soon cleared away, and he wrote to Brutus, 'The natural manliness of the boy Caesar is amazing' (Ad Brutum 1.3). In July, 43, just four months before Octavian handed him over to the hatred of Antony, he wrote, still optimistic, 'I hope that in spite of many opposing influences I shall be able to hold him, for he seems to have character' (Ad Brutum 1.18).

Cicero rested his hope on many a leader in turn—on Pompey, on Brutus, on Octavian, even on Julius

Caesar for a little while. They all failed him. But he did not vary in the object of his hope—the continuance of a free State in Rome.

It is interesting to note how many of the principles that, as Cicero thought, underlie a free government are also set forth by Lord Bryce in his work on Modern Democracies, which is, I suppose, the latest and most authoritative word on the subject.

Like Cicero, Lord Bryce bases his hopes for democracy on a spiritual view of the universe. He says (1.50):

It is the conception of a happier life for all, coupled with a mystic faith in the people, that great multitude through whom speaks the voice of the Almighty Power that makes for righteousness,—this it is that constitutes the vital impulse of democracy.

Both the ancient and the modern statesman believe that justice is the only foundation of a free State and that justice is bound up with religion. I quote again from Bryce (2.606):

... It is by a reverence for the Powers unseen that impose those <moral> sanctions that ... the fabric of society has been held together. The future of democracy, then, is a part of two larger branches of inquiry, the future of religion and the prospects of human progress.

We have seen how Cicero glorified the value of political services, having in mind the statesman who guides the destiny of his country either in public office or by unofficial influence, rather than the private voter. Lord Bryce, who is not at all sure that the democratic form of government will last forever, says that its continued existence depends entirely on the sense of responsibility of all the citizens (2.490). "No government demands so much from the citizens, and none gives so much back" (2.608).

As Cicero had enthusiastic confidence that the Roman Republic was the best of all possible governments, so Lord Bryce, in his more moderate way, concludes that "Democracy, taken all in all, has given better practical results than the Rule of One Man or the Rule of a Class; for it has at least extinguished many of the evils by which they were defaced" (2.562).

But, no more than Cicero, does Lord Bryce believe in the unrestricted rule of the majority. He does not, in Cicero's vivacious way, call the people 'a wild beast', but he does say that a great risk attends conferring the suffrage on the masses and that not even the most fervent democrat can maintain that a majority is always right (2.390). Impetuous decisions must be checked by some means. He cites both the Roman system and the modern American system of governmental checks and balances as effective methods.

In spite of the natural inequality of men, however, Lord Bryce believes, as did Cicero, that the private rights of all must be equal. The fundamental equality and ultimate worth of all men, because they are possessed of souls, he tells us, is quite distinct from their intellectual or moral capacity.

In spite of the disaster in which Cicero's cause went down, his principles are still vital for all believers in a

free State. Two stand out preeminent. The first is that the State exists for the good of the whole people. A pledge to this effect is common to-day in pre-election promises, but not so common in post-election fulfillment. Party government seems usually to consist in legislating for particular classes or localities and in appointing to office the most active party workers. But democracy is only a meaningless sound in any State where the interests of any class are ignored. This doctrine of the rights of the people as a whole in the government is no mere philosophical platitude. It is practical enough to furnish the text for the leading editorial in a number of The New York Times, in the fall of 1921. The Times, in deploring the conduct of the agricultural bloc in the Senate at Washington, says:

No one denies the right of a Representative to consult the wishes of his constituents. He should do the utmost that he conscientiously can to advocate and further their interests. But always there must be obligatory upon him the *large interest of the whole people* <the italics are mine>. He is sent to Washington not merely to speak for a district, but also to act for the nation. This belief was so strongly held by Daniel Webster that he once wrote that he would not take from the Massachusetts Legislature a direction how to vote in the Senate. He was a Senator from a State, but he was also a judge sworn to decide as *he thought best for the entire country*.

The second principle that concerns us is that the service of the State is the supreme duty of all citizens. In the performance of this duty, as Lord Bryce points out, rests the only hope of Republicanism. The *equites* of Cicero's time preferred order to liberty and were not willing to do their part to keep both. So they obtained order and with it monarchy under Augustus. For 1,000 years thereafter no voice was raised in Europe in favor of free government. But those who prefer freedom, even with the mistakes and the slow progress and the necessary compromises of popular rule, must work together to maintain it. 'There is only one ship for all good men', said Cicero, using the metaphor that was old even when he used it. And we may add that on that ship there can be no idle passengers; we are all members of the crew and must take a hand in bringing democracy safe to port.

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A SPIDER AS A WEATHER PROPHET

In his article An Animal Weather Bureau, THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 14.89-93, 97-100, Professor McCartney had something to say (92) concerning spiders as weather prophets. In The New York Herald, October 14, 1922, under the caption, A Trusted Missouri Weather Prophet, appeared the following extract from the Macon Chronicle-Herald:

"A spider was largely accountable for the success of the recent Macon County Fair. . . . In the back yard of Weather Observer Will C. Brown is an old spider he uses as his weather indicator with greater confidence than all the elaborate Government equipment. The Fair management was anxious to get the forecast a week ahead for publication, but the reports from Washington were vague. Then Mr. Brown boldly predicted fair weather for the entire week, basing it upon the spider's actions. Mr. Brown says that when a spider runs out slender filaments, it is a sure sign of fair weather for at least a week".

C. K.